




CHILD WELFARE EXPERTS WIDELY VIEW adoption as the most
effective means of promoting the well-being of children whose biolog-
ical parents cannot care for them.' Accordingly, federal law and the
laws of every state recognize the current preference for adoption. 2
Federal and state laws have regulated adoption for over 150 years.3
Over time these laws have differed regarding required procedures, 4
available legal mechanisms, 5 and necessary or preferred characteris-
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grateful to Susan Frelich Appleton for her support and guidance throughout the drafting
of this Article. Thank you also to Lindsay Bozicevich, Carol Feinberg, Elisheva Hirshman-
Green, Bryan Lammon, Adrienne Van Winkle, and the members of the University of San
Francisco Law Review for their insightful comments and critique.
1. Michael S. Wald, Adults'Sexual Orientation and State Determinations Regarding Place-
ment of Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 381, 411-12 (2006) ("Child development specialists all agree
that adoption is the best means of promoting the well-being of most children who cannot
be reunited with their parents. ).
2. See id. at 412.
3. Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J.
FAM. L. 443, 465 (1972).
4. For example, in response to the difficulty of finding the birth fathers of children
relinquished for adoption in order to get their consent to the adoption, several states have
created putative father registries which "eliminate the need for adoption notification or
consent for a man who failed to take the initiative by registering." D. KELLY WE1SBERG &
SusAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAw 1034 (3d ed. 2006).
5. States have recently enacted a number of legal mechanisms of which both the
birth and adoptive parents can avail themselves during the adoption process. For example,
a number of states allow for voluntary open adoption and some states also authorize judi-
cial approval of open adoption agreements between the birth and adoptive parents. Id. at
1095-96.
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tics of potential adoptive parents. 6 The "best interests of the child"
standard as the primary consideration in determining where to place
a child, however, remains a constant.7 Throughout adoption's exis-
tence as a legal institution, legislatures, courts, and adoption agencies
have consistently adhered to the view that only placement in a "tradi-
tional" family structure consisting of two legally married, opposite-sex
parents who reside in the same household can serve a child's best
interests. 8
Adoption law's continued adherence to the view that children
should live only in traditional family structures raises a number of con-
cerns. First, the traditional family structure does not reflect the reali-
ties of modern society. Instead, it accounts for only a distinct minority
of today's family structures.9 Acknowledging the changing nature of
the family structure, family law now recognizes and protects non-tradi-
tional family structures in many other contexts. 10 In some instances,
family law even mandates the formation of certain non-traditional
family structures."1 Given this shift away from the traditional family
structure in both society and family law, it makes little sense for adop-
tion law to deny non-traditional families the opportunity to form and
gain legal protections.
Second, the argument that adoption agencies should place chil-
dren exclusively in traditional family structures succeeds only if place-
6. In fact, the laws today remain in a constant state of flux regarding whether gay,
lesbian, and unmarried individuals and couples may adopt children. See Wald, supra note 1,
at 410; see also infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
7. Note, Joint Adoption: A Queer Option?, 15 VT. L. REv. 197, 200 (1990) ("[I]n the
United States[,] adoption law has focused on the needs and welfare of the child. The 'best
interest of the child' standard is the critical determinate in adoption law today.").
8. See Naomi R. Cahn, Refraining Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 31
(1997) (discussing the traditional assumption that a family structure consisting of two mar-
ried parents constitutes the best alternative for adoptive children); see alsoJuLE BEREBITSKY,
LIKE OUR VERY OwN: ADOPTION AND THE CHANGING CULTURE OF MOTHERHOOD 1851-1950,
at 3 (2000) (discussing how adoption practice developed into a manner of recreating what
many consider the "ideal and only legitimate family"-the biogenetic family consisting of a
"heterosexual couple with 'planned for' children living in an 'emotionally' healthy
home"); Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption
of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 590-91 (1999) (discussing the legal consensus "that
parenthood within marriage best protects children"); Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children
from the Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and
Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 305, 334 (2006) ("Adoption law generally pro-
hibits an unmarried couple from adopting an unrelated child jointly.").
9. Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 239, 246
(2001) ("[T]he traditional marital family has become a statistical minority of family units
in our society.").
10. See infra Part I.B (discussing the law's recognition of non-traditional families).
11. See infra Part I.B (discussing the law's recognition of non-traditional families).
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ment in traditional families represents the sole manner through
which states can further the desired ends of adoption law. In many
instances, however, non-traditional family structures can provide chil-
dren with the positive results adoption law seeks to obtain-a home
that provides the child with love, support, and stability.' 2 While legisla-
tures and courts recognize the value of non-traditional family struc-
tures in many areas of family law, adoption law largely devalues these
non-traditional family structures.' 3
Finally, state insistence on placing children in traditional family
structures conflicts with adoption law's primary goal of placing as
many children as possible in loving, stable, and supportive homes.14 Ad-
herence to the belief that only traditional family structures can serve a
child's best interests greatly contributes15 to the fact that today over
100,000 children remain wards of the state, waiting for a family to
adopt them.16 Research, as well as common sense, indicates that cate-
gorically banning classes of potential parents from adoption eligibility
reduces the number of children who will find homes.' 7 Consequently,
children awaiting adoption face a severe disadvantage. These children
are denied placement with non-traditional families who may consti-
tute the only families willing or able to adopt them. At the same time,
however, states offer legal recognition and protection outside of the
adoption realm to non-traditional families with children.18
This Article challenges the view that adoption decision-makers
should place children only in traditional family structures. More spe-
12. See infra Part II (discussing the relationship between family structure and the
objectives of adoption law).
13. See infra Part I.C (discussing adoption law's continued adherence to the tradi-
tional family structure).
14. In reJacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 401 (N.Y. 1995) (stating that adoption law's primary
goal consists of "encouraging the adoption of as many children as possible regardless of
the sexual orientation or marital status of the individuals seeking to adopt them"); In re
M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 845, 854 (D.C. 1995) (explaining that many courts have shown a
preference for liberal construction of adoption statutes so that the state can place as many
children as possible in loving homes).
15. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Waiting for Loving: The Child's Fundamental Right to
Adoption, 34 CAP. U. L. REv. 297, 326 (2005) ("In the face of a shortage of adoptive parents,
categorical bans actually ensure that some children will never have a family of their own.");
see also infta notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
16. As of September 30, 2005, 114,000 children remained in state custody awaiting an
adoptive family. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
AFCARS REPORT 13, at 5 (2005), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_
research/afcars/tar/reportl3.pdf [hereinafter AFCARS REPORT 13].
17. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
18. See generally infta Part I.B (discussing the law's recognition of non-traditional
families).
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cifically, it argues courts, legislatures, and adoption agencies should
allow two individuals involved in a close, but non-sexual, friendship to
adopt a child together.1 9 Permitting two emotionally and financially
supportive parents to raise a child can further adoption law's goal of
placing children in loving, stable homes. Allowing joint adoptions by
close friends almost certainly will also increase the overall number of
children placed in homes. Further, single individuals whom the state
deems eligible to adopt on their own, but who choose not to because
of the great difficulties inherent in raising a child alone, may adopt if
allowed to do so jointly with a close friend. 20 While it may seem unfa-
miliar to some individuals, in many respects the family model advo-
cated here (the "proposed model") is not a new one. In a number of
cultures, both within and outside the United States, community mem-
bers often come together to raise children, with friends of the biologi-
cal parents assuming a parental role in the child's life. 21
Part I of this Article discusses the breakdown of the traditional
family as the prevailing norm in American culture. Part II explores the
goals that adoption agencies, legislatures, and courts attempt to fur-
ther through the historical insistence on placing children in tradi-
tional families. This Part also considers whether states can attain these
goals more effectively by discontinuing their strict reliance on the
traditional family structure, and instead allowing two individuals in-
volved in a close, but non-sexual, friendship to adopt a child. Part III
addresses some of the underlying assumptions of adoption law and
19. This Article will only analyze the possibility of two close friends adopting and rais-
ing a child together. The author does not mean to suggest that two constitutes the optimal
number of legally recognized parents for a child. Rather, the analysis here focuses on only
one of the potential family structures that have not yet gained recognition in the adoption
realm. While a discussion of family structures containing more than two legally recognized
co-parents is beyond the scope of this Article, a number of courts and commentators have
recently broached the issue. See, e.g., Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2007); A. v. B., [2007] 83 O.R.3d 561 (Can.); see also Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two?
Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L.
& FAM. STUD. 1 (2008); Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 47
(2007).
20. See Angela Mae Kupenda, Two Parents Are Better than None: Whether Two Single, Afri-
can American Adults-Who Are Not in a Traditional Marriage or a Romantic or Sexual Relation-
ship with Each Other-Should Be Allowed to Jointly Adopt and Co-Parent African American
Children, 35 LouISVWLLEJ. FAm. L. 703, 703-10 (1997).
21. See, e.g., id. at 712 (advocating for an adoption model that would allow two Afri-
can-American adults not involved in a romantic relationship to adopt an African-American
child together, and discussing the historical tradition in the African-American community
of "[shared parenting] by the extended family and friends"); Woodhouse, supra note 15, at
309 (discussing how prehistoric mothers had substantial help in raising their children from
relatives and community members).
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practice that may be preventing states from implementing, or even
considering, the proposed model. Finally, Part IV suggests various
methods through which states could provide for joint adoptions by
two close friends in a manner that promotes an adoptive child's best
interests.
I. The Status of the Traditional Family
A. The Decline of Marriage
Unwavering insistence that adoptive families mirror a family
structure that now represents a minority in our society makes little
sense.22 Today, a higher proportion of adult Americans remain un-
married than ever before. 23 According to census data, in 2000 only
52% of households in the United States were maintained by married
couples. 24 The number of unmarried couples who lived together and
shared a close personal relationship reached 5.5 million in 2000, an
increase of 2.3 million since 1990.25 In addition, legally recognized
non-traditional relationships have increased as a number of states now
legally recognize non-marital relationships between adults, such as do-
mestic partnerships, civil unions, and reciprocal beneficiaries. 26
B. The Recognition of Non-Traditional Families
Given the significant increase in non-marital households, it
makes sense that today half of all children are born into or raised in
non-marital households. 27 The law has generally recognized the shift
away from the marital family structure, and most impediments previ-
ously faced by non-marital children have been removed. 28 Addition-
ally, not only are traditional families less prevalent than ever before,
but courts and legislation now commonly allow, recognize, or demand
the formation of non-traditional family arrangements in the various
contexts discussed below.
22. Fineman, supra note 9, at 246.
23. David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friends and for Lovers of All Sorts, a Status Other
than Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1347, 1364 (2001).
24. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-
PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003
pubs/censr-5.pdf.
25. Id.
26. Chambers, supra note 23, at 1349-51.
27. Vivian E. Hamilton, Family Structure, Children, and Law, 24 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 9,
9 (2007).
28. Id. at 10.
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1. Divorce
When a couple with children divorces, the parents often continue
to share physical and legal custody of their children. In fact, as of 2006
thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have statutes that pre-
sume some form of joint custody upon divorce.29 Even when biologi-
cal parents divorce before the child is born (in which case the child
has not already formed a bond with each parent), the presumption of
joint custody remains in some states.30 Similarly, the Uniform Parent-
age Act presumes paternity with parental obligations and the right to
seek custody if a man and the mother of the child "were married to
each other and the child is born within 300 days after the marriage is
terminated... "31 Thus, in the divorce context, courts will allow two
individuals who reside in separate households, no longer share an inti-
mate, marital relationship, and oftentimes lack even a friendship, 32 to
raise a child together as co-parents. 33
2. Step-Parent Arrangements
High divorce rates have made multiple parent arrangements
common in today's society.3 4 Current laws allow an unmarried adult
who enjoys joint custody of a child to marry someone not legally rec-
ognized as the child's other parent.3 5 Consequently, the child may
29. S. Con. Res. 121, 109th Cong. (2006).
30. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 2004); D.C. CODE § 16-914 (2001).
31. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACr § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 16 (Supp. 2008).
32. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding how the
proposed model avoids many of the negative effects on children that can occur in the post-
divorce joint custody context.
33. Furthermore, many courts and state statutes focus primarily on the actual parent-
child relationship when resolving custody issues in the post-divorce context. These courts
only consider a parent's non-traditional characteristics, such as sexual orientation or cur-
rent relationship status, if the evidence demonstrates that such characteristics are in fact
negatively affecting the child. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-914 (2001) ("[T]he court may issue
an order that provides for frequent and continuing contact between each parent and the
minor child or children and for the sharing of responsibilities of child-rearing and encour-
aging the love, affection, and contact between the minor child or children and the parents
regardless of marital status."); Am. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.12 (Matthew Bender 2002) (stating that the pro-
posed regulation prohibits decisionmaking based on race, ethnicity, sex, religion, sexual
orientation, and extramarital sexual conduct, except in rare circumstances). In the post-
divorce context, children may thus find themselves in the custody of a parent who does not
fit the definition of the traditional, married, heterosexual parent.
34. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 n.8 (Cal. 1993).
35. Additionally, the state will only recognize the marriage if both individuals meet
the state's other legal requirements for marital eligibility (i.e., each individual is of age and
not already married).
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split time between the two homes in which each of his or her legal
parents lives with his or her spouse. This effectively results in three or
more parents raising the child.36 Although step-parents do not have
many legal parental rights (unless one of the legal parent's rights are
terminated) ,7 they often contribute greatly to rearing the child who
resides in their household.3 8 Additionally, even though step-parents
may not have "parental" rights per se, they do, of course, have the
right to run their household in the manner they see fit within the
boundaries of the law. General household decisions made by a step-
parent will often affect a step-child who spends all or part of his or her
time residing in the household. Current law thus allows children to
split their time between the two separate households of their legally
recognized parents, often with three or more individuals serving as
parental figures.3 9 This legally recognized family form represents a sig-
nificant departure from the traditional family structure.
3. Single Parents
In the United States, nearly one quarter of children are born to
unwed mothers.40 Thus, a great number of children reside in non-
traditional family structures from the time their lives begin.4 1 The per-
centage of single parent households increased from 9% of all house-
holds in 1990 to 16% in 2000, and overall, about 26% of children
under the age of twenty-one live in homes where one parent remains
absent.42 Additionally, all fifty states allow single individuals to adopt a
36. Am. Academy of Pediatrics, Family Pediatrics: Report of the Task Force on the Family,
111 PEDIATRICS 1541, 1551 (2003), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/
reprint/1II/6/S1/1541.pdf ("Nearly all children in stepfamilies . . .experience having
more than [two] parenting adults.").
37. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 4, at 1089 (noting that step-parent adoption
requires that only one of the child's birth parents retain parental rights).
38. Mary Ann Mason & Nicole Zayac, Rethinking Stepparent Rights: Has the AL! Found a
Better Definition? 36 F m. L.Q. 227, 229 (2002) ("[M]any stepparents do play a significant
parenting role in the lives of their stepchildren and most residential stepparents contribute
significantly to their economic well-being.").
39. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing familial situations in which
three or more individuals serve in parental roles).
40. U.S. CENSUS BuREhu, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHIL-
DREN: 2002, at 1 (2005).
41. See infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text for a comparison of the benefits
adoptive children would receive from a family structure containing two friends as co-par-
ents as opposed to a single parent family structure.
42. Parents Without Partners, http://www.parentswithoutpartners.org/supportl.htm
(last visited May 1, 2009).
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child,43 and the Uniform Parentage Act provides rights and protec-
tions to single individuals who wish to conceive children through do-
nor insemination. 44 Commentators note that the "dramatic increase
in the numbers of single-parent families is attributable in part to the
increasing economic independence of women and the decreasing
stigma attached to nonmarital births."
45
4. Donor Insemination
In addition to aiding single individuals' ability to conceive chil-
dren, the advancement of technology in the donor insemination
realm facilitates a number of other non-traditional parenting arrange-
ments. 4 6 When a sperm donor claims advanced agreement with the
biological mother regarding his involvement as a co-parent, many
courts grant the donor parental rights.47 This has occurred even
where the donor and the biological mother not only remain unmar-
ried, but also remain uninvolved in any type of romantic relation-
ship. 48 In fact, some courts grant parental rights and obligations to
sperm donors where the donor simply claims that he and the biologi-
cal mother are friends or mere acquaintances. 49
Additionally, because most laws do not condition access to donor
insemination on an individual's sexual orientation,50 a trend has de-
veloped in some communities where gay and lesbian couples agree to
combine the genetic materials from one member of each couple to
43. Sara R. David, Turning Parental Rights into Parental Obligations-Holding Same-Sex,
Non-Biological Parents Responsible for Child Support, 39 NEw ENG. L. Riv. 921, 927 (2005)
(explaining that while every state allows single individuals to adopt, some states exclude
single homosexual individuals from adoption eligibility).
44. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 702 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
45. WEISBERG & APPLErON, supra note 4, at 447.
46. See Storrow, supra note 8, at 310-11 (discussing the lifting of restrictions governing
artificial insemination).
47. See, e.g., In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (holding that if an agreement existed
between the sperm donor and biological mother, who the sperm donor claimed were
friends and the biological mother claimed were acquaintances, then the donor would have
parental rights and obligations);Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986)
(affirming the trial court's judgment by strictly construing the relevant statute and grant-
ing parental status to the sperm donor, who had an ongoing friendship with the biological
mother, and granting him substantial visitation rights). But see In re KM.H., 169 P.3d 1025
(Kan. 2007) (denying paternity rights to a known sperm donor, who was an acquaintance
of the biological mother, because the donor failed to produce adequate written evidence
of any agreement with the biological mother regarding parental rights).
48. See cases cited supra note 47.
49. See cases cited supra note 47.
50. John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproduction Technology, 55
CASE W. RES. L. Rxv. 323, 348 (2004).
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create a child whom the couples will raise jointly.5 1 In addition,
"[h]undreds of children, most in San Francisco, New York, and other
urban centers, grow up with multiple parents, usually due to arrange-
ments among gay and lesbian couples and their friends of the oppo-
site sex who were involved in the conception and birth." 52 The
couples involved in these arrangements believe their children "benefit
from being exposed to a wider range of adult influences. 5 3
5. Same-Sex Co-Parents
A number of courts also recognize non-traditional family struc-
tures consisting of two same-sex individuals involved in a committed
relationship who wish to obtain legal status as co-parents. 54 Same-sex
couples, however, remain unable to marry in forty-six states.5 5 Thus,
although the same-sex co-parents share an intimate relationship that
exceeds mere friendship, any family structure that involves same-sex
co-parents by definition falls outside of the traditional marital family
structure. In the adoption realm, legislatures and courts in many juris-
dictions provide individuals with the right to adopt their current or
former same-sex partner's biological or adoptive child through "sec-
ond-parent adoption" procedures. 56 Additionally, a number of courts,
adoption agencies, and statutes provide two individuals involved in a
committed same-sex relationship with the right to adopt a non-related
child jointly.57 Finally, outside of the adoption context, some courts
have taken the significant step of granting parental status to each
member of a current or former same-sex couple where one member
51. R. Alto Charo, And Baby Makes Three-or Four, or Five, or Six: Redefining the Family
After the Reprotech Revolution, 15 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 231, 251 (2000).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Courts have also granted two individuals of the same sex the right to raise a child
together in the context of kinship adoptions. The common scenario involves the biological
mother and her mother obtaining joint parental rights to the child. See Sharon S. v. Supe-
rior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 571 (Cal. 2003) (discussing kinship adoptions in which a "grand-
parent or other relative became a second legal parent of a child").
55. Abby Goodnough, Rejecting Veto, Vermont Backs Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2009, at Al, A16.
56. Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 575 (George, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(labeling unremarkable the majority's holding that California recognizes second parent
adoptions because, "[a]t least 20 other jurisdictions have already done so").
57. SeeJoanna Grossman, A New York Court Authorizes A Lesbian Couple's Joint Adoption of
A Child: Part of a Growing Same-Sex Adoption Trend, FINDLAw, Apr. 19, 2004, http://writ.news.
findlaw.com/grossman/20040419.html ("Recently, courts, legislatures, and politicians
have been grappling with the recent surge in gay marriage advocacy and opposition. But at
the same time, those same bodies are quietly recognizing rights for gays and lesbians that
have traditionally been reserved for heterosexuals-the right to jointly adopt. .. ").
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of the couple became pregnant with the intention of raising the child
with her same-sex partner.58
C. Adoption Law's Continued Adherence to the Traditional Family
Structure
Although adoption law recognizes non-traditional family struc-
tures in a few limited contexts 5 9 for the most part it remains signifi-
cantly slower to depart from its insistence on the traditional marital
family structure than the rest of family law. For example, adoption law
and practice continue to differentiate between marital and non-mari-
tal potential adoptive parents.60 Utah's adoption statute prohibits
joint or singular adoption by "cohabitating" individuals involved in a
sexual relationship "that is not a legally valid and binding marriage. '61
In 2008, Arkansas voters passed a ballot initiative banning adoption by
unmarried individuals, 62 and the New Hampshire Supreme Court
held that unmarried individuals cannot adopt a child jointly.63 While
some states explicitly declare through legislation or court decision
that unmarried couples64 may adopt a child jointly,65 "[a] doption law
58. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) (declaring the biological
mother's former lesbian partner a legal parent with support obligations to the children
whom the couple had agreed to raise together prior to the biological mother receiving
donor insemination); KM. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005) (holding that both members
of a former lesbian couple were the legal parents of twins born after one of the women
donated her ova to the other, where the couple had planned to raise the children in the
home they shared).
59. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing adoptions involving
same-sex couples).
60. Wald, supra note 1, at 410.
61. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (2000). The statute bans adoption by any person
cohabitating with an individual who is not a legal spouse, and does not distinguish between
individuals who cohabitate with a same-sex versus an opposite-sex partner. Id. The legisla-
tive history suggests that the state passed the statute based on legislators' fears that the
children of parents who cohabitate with another adult to whom the parent is not married
have a greater likelihood of suffering abuse. Scott H. Clark, Married Persons Favored as Adop-
tive Parents: The Utah Perspective, 5 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 203, 204 (2003).
62. Mary Francis Berry, Gay But Equal?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A29.
63. In rejason C., 533 A.2d 32 (N.H. 1987); see also Allison Freehling, The Same, but
Different, DALY PREss (Newport News), May 21, 2006, at G2.
64. In jurisdictions where unmarried couples can adopt, courts have discussed only
on a few occasions whether the unmarried couples must cohabitate in order to qualify for
adoption. See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text. The adoption statutes that courts
have interpreted to allow for adoption by unmarried individuals do not explicitly address
whether the individuals must cohabitate in order to adopt. See, e.g., In re Infant Girl W., 845
N.E.2d 229, 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (construing IND. CODE § 31-19-2-2 (1998)). Possible
reasons for why courts rarely address the issue include that unmarried individuals involved
in a romantic relationship, but who have not made the decision to cohabitate, may not
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generally prohibits an unmarried couple from adopting an unrelated
child jointly .... ,,66 Additionally, legislation in five states limiting
adoptions by homosexual individuals or same-sex couples, who by def-
inition cannot legally marry in those states, further demonstrates
adoption law's reluctance to move away from the traditional marital
family structure. Finally, no statute or court decision expressly states
that two individuals involved in a close, but non-sexual, friendship
may adopt a child together. Thus, it is unsurprising that adoptions by
unmarried couples currently account for a mere 2% of all adoptions,
while adoptions by married couples constitute almost 70% of all
adoptions. 67
Across the country, individuals continue forming family struc-
tures that differ markedly from the traditional family structure, find-
ing that other arrangements more effectively serve their familial
needs. In fact, the traditional family structure now comprises a distinct
minority of all family structures, 68 and the societal move away from
the traditional family structure likely will not change anytime soon. 69
Census officials note that "the increasing prevalence of non-tradi-
tional family structures reflects powerful societal trends that cannot be
easily reversed. '70 Consequently, much of family law recognizes and
believe that adoption is an option for individuals in their situation, or may not feel ready to
undertake an adoption together.
65. See, e.g., Infant Girl W, 845 N.E.2d at 243 (holding that Indiana's adoption statute
does not prohibit unmarried couples, regardless of their sexual orientation, from adopt-
ing); In reJacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 401 (N.Y. 1995) ("[T]he two adoptions sought-one by
an unmarried heterosexual couple, the other by the lesbian partner of the child's
mother-are fully consistent with the adoption statute."); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803
A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002) ("There is no language in the Adoption Act precluding two
unmarried same-sex partners (or unmarried heterosexual partners) from adopting a child
who had no legal parents."); Florida in the Dark on Adoption Rights, REPUBLICAN (Spring-
field), Jan. 14, 2005, at A12 (discussing how Florida's adoption statute, while banning
adoptions by same-sex couples, allows for adoption by unmarried heterosexual couples);
Tim Padgett, Gay Family Values, TIME, July 16, 2007 (discussing the law that the Colorado
legislature recently passed granting unmarried couples the right to adopt).
66. Storrow, supra note 8, at 334; see alsoJehnna Irene Hanan, The Best Interest of the
Child: Eliminating Discrimination in the Screening of Adoptive Parents, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 167, 168 (1997) ("Most states still allow... discrimination on the basis of the age or
marital status of potential adoptive parents.").
67. AFCARS REPORT 13, supra note 16, at 8.
68. Michael C. Gottlieb, Troxel v. Granville and its Implications for Families and Practice:
A Multidisciplinary Symposium Introduction to the Special Issue, 41 FAm. CT. REv. 8, 9 (2003).
69. Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Multiple Families, Multiple Goals, Multiple Failures: The
Need for "Limited Equalization" as a Theory of Child Support, 32 HARv. J. L. & GENDER 109, 113.
70. Census Says Traditional Family May Soon Be Exception, THE TECH (MIT), Aug. 30,
1994, at 3, available at http://www-tech.mit.edu/V1 14/N35/briefs2.35w.html.
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protects non-traditional family structures. 71 As former Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor acknowledged, "[t]he demographic
changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average
American family."'72
Adoption law and practice should grant adoptive families the
same freedom to structure their family in ways that differ from the
traditional family structure. Additionally, the more than 100,000 chil-
dren waiting for a family to adopt them should have the right, as chil-
dren outside of the adoption realm have, to live with families who will
provide a loving, stable, and supportive environment, regardless of
whether the family falls within the narrow definition of "traditional." 73
The argument becomes even more compelling, as the following Part
discusses, if states can attain the desired ends of adoption law through
adoption by non-traditional family structures such as the one advo-
cated in this Article.
II. The Relationship Between Family Structure and the
Objectives of Adoption Law
Adoption law strives to place children in family structures that
provide stability, love, and emotional and financial support.74 This
Part first argues adoption law can meet these ends as or more effec-
tively by allowing the placement of children in non-traditional family
structures consisting of two adults involved in a close, but non-sexual,
friendship. It then analyzes the likely alternatives for many children
awaiting adoption if states choose not to implement the proposed
model.
A. Can the Proposed Family Structure Further the Objectives of
Adoption Law?
1. Stability Due to the Co-Parents' Relationship Status
One prevalent argument in favor of laws requiring the placement
of children in only traditional family structures maintains that this
71. See supra Part I.B (discussing the law's recognition of non-traditional families).
72. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
73. See Woodhouse, supra note 15, at 300.
74. See In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that
"providing a child with two parents by adoption promotes a stable, supportive and nurtur-
ing environment ... advantages that are clearly in the child's best interest" and finding
that the petitioners "are of sufficient ability to rear the child and to furnish the child with
suitable support and education"); see also Suzanne Herman, The Revised Michigan Adoption
Code: The Reemergence of Direct Placement Adoptions and the Role and Duties of the Attorney, 74 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 583, 585-86 (1997).
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structure provides the most stable environment for a child.75 The sta-
bility that may have once existed in traditional family structures, how-
ever, is simply not the reality today.76 The no-fault divorce laws in
place throughout the country provide, along with the simplicity of ob-
taining a marriage license, continues to contribute to soaring divorce
rates.77 Experts predict half of all American children will experience
the break-up of their parents' marriage.78 Additionally, close to half of
children who witness their parents' divorce will experience the subse-
quent remarriage and re-divorce of one of their parents.
79
These statistics show that obtaining a marriage license does not
automatically render a relationship or family structure more stable.
"[L] oosened marriage laws have reduced or eliminated many substan-
tive, and most formal, restrictions on entry into marriage for heter-
osexuals."80 The state remains completely uninvolved in assuring the
75. See Clark, supra note 61, at 209 (describing as the primary factor for most mem-
bers of the Board of Child and Family in deciding to ban adoption by unmarried adults in
Utah the "collective assessment of the practical and legal advantages conferred upon chil-
dren who live in homes with legally married mothers and fathers[,] ... including rights of
inheritance and rights to health insurance coverage, in addition to survivor benefits and
other entitlements provided to legal dependents under the social security system").
76. Similarly, some courts have implied that adoptions by single parents are permissi-
ble because these courts expect that single individuals will eventually marry and form the
more stable traditional family unit. In Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children &Family
Services, for example, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[i]t is not irrational to think that
heterosexual singles have a markedly greater probability of eventually establishing a mar-
ried household and, thus, providing their adopted children with a stable, dual-gender
parenting environment." 358 F.3d 804, 822 (11th Cir. 2004). This argument, however, fails
to consider the great degree of change and disruption to a child's life that necessarily
ensues when his or her single parent decides to marry or remarry. SARA McLANAHAN &
GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 29 (1994)
(explaining that when a single parent decides to bring a significant other into the house-
hold through marriage or cohabitation, it significantly disrupts many aspects of the child's
life); Am. Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 36, at 1551 ("When a parent remarries the
child's life is made more complicated and is again disrupted.").
77. Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. Soc. POL'V & L. 307,
338-42 (2004).
78. Frank Furstenberg et al., The Life Course of Children of Divorce, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 656
(1983).
79. MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: How WE DESTROY LASTING
LovE 76 (1996). Additionally, among the millions of children who will witness their par-
ents' divorce, one of every ten will also live through three or more marital dissolutions
involving one of their parents. Id.
80. Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, U. CHI. LEGAL F.
1, 6 (2004); see alsoJeremiah A. Ho, What's Love Got to do With it? The Corporations Model of
Marriage in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 1239, 1271 (2007) ("The re-
quirements-other than that the couple is comprised of two opposite-sex persons-to ob-
tain a marriage license are generally sparse, requiring only the names, addresses, parties'
ages, names of parents, and whether any of the parties had previous marriages.").
Spring 2009]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
compatibility of the two individuals who wish to marry.8' Conse-
quently, the state lacks knowledge as to whether the marital couple's
relationship is more long-standing, has a higher level of intimacy and
commitment, or is more stable than a close, non-sexual friendship be-
tween two individuals who cannot, or do not wish to, marry.
In fact, studies show that close friendships are often important,
stable, intimate, and committed relationships in people's lives.8 2 Many
women report feeling emotionally closer to their female friends than
to their husbands;8 3 and research shows that women usually make a
deep commitment and devote a great deal of time and intensity to
their friends.8 4 In denying adoption rights to potential co-parents in-
volved in a non-marital friendship, legislatures, courts, and adoption
agencies may have relied on the fact that unmarried couples have
higher dissolution rates than married couples.8 5 Friendships, however,
differ from the romantic relationships studied in determining the
probability of "break-ups" for marital and non-marital couples. Many
individuals enter into romantic relationships with just one person at a
time, often in search of "the one" with whom an individual will exclu-
sively share the rest of his or her life. These relationships arguably
involve a greater chance of dissolution than friendships, of which indi-
viduals often have many at the same time and do not undertake in a
search for "the one."
Furthermore, even if lawmakers considered individuals involved
in close friendships to fall within the category of unmarried couples,
an anti-adoption argument based on the greater prevalence of break-
ups among unmarried couples would remain unpersuasive. Research
involving the dissolution rates of unmarried couples fails to consider
separately the subset of unmarried couples serious enough to under-
81. Hamilton, supra note 77, at 341.
82. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 629 n.26
(1980) ("Any view of intimate association focused on associational values must therefore
include friendship.").
83. SUSAN MAUSHART, WIFEWORK: WHAT MARRIAGE REALLY MEANS FOR WOMEN 16-17,
167 (2003) (noting that most wives report experiencing greater emotional intimacy with
their female friends than their male spouses); STACEYJ. OLIKER, BEST FRIENDS AND MAR-
RIAGE: EXCHANGE AMONG WOMEN 112-21 (1989) (discussing how, in the author's studies,
women reported feeling closer to their female friends than to their husbands).
84. A number of researchers have studied friendships among women. See generally,
e.g., HELEN GOULDNER & MARY SYMONS STRONG, SPEAKING OF FRIENDSHIP: MIDDLE-CLASS
WOMEN AND THEIR FRIENDS (1987); ELINOR LENZ & BARBARA MEP.HOFF, THE FEMINIZATION
OF AMERICA: How WOMEN'S VALUES ARE CHANGING OUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIvEs (1985);
LETTY COTrIN POGREBIN, Among Friends: Who We Like, Why We Like Them, and What We
do with Them (1987).
85. See Wald, supra note 1, at 414.
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take the legal obligation of adopting together. 86 Such a study would
likely produce different results, as adoption law requires that a poten-
tial adoptive parent have the willingness and ability to take on a great
deal of obligations to the child.87
2. Stability as a Result of Legal Protections and Benefits
Another argument for laws allowing for adoption by only tradi-
tional family structures contends that current laws protect and benefit
such family structures, and thus these structures offer a greater degree
of stability.88 This argument suffers from circular reasoning. If the sta-
bility of the marital family comes from the legal protections and bene-
fits that the law provides, 89 then the better response is to modify the
law to provide legal protections to the relationship between the adop-
tive child and each non-traditional adoptive co-parent. Providing legal
recognition to the relationship between a child and each non-tradi-
tional adoptive parent will allow children placed in non-traditional
families to receive the same benefits and protections they would re-
ceive if placed in a traditional family structure. If the family structure
dissolves, co-parents would have the same obligations to the child as
parents involved in the dissolution of a traditional family structure. 90
Although the relationship between the co-parents and child car-
ries primary importance, states wishing to add even greater stability to
this family structure could offer legal protections to the relationship
between the two individuals who choose to become co-parents. In fact,
some scholars propose the state should offer recognition and protec-
tion to certain types of friendships. 91 Under these models, if co-par-
86. See id. at 414 (explaining that barring all unmarried couples from adoption be-
cause of the higher break-up rate of unmarried couples as compared to married couples
would not reflect a sound policy decision, as it would prevent adoption even by unmarried
couples "in long-term, highly stable relationships").
87. See In Re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 857-59 (D.C. 1995).
88. See Clark, supra note 61, at 209 (discussing how decision-makers relied in part on
testimony "to the effect that Utah law conferred substantial benefits upon children of le-
gally married couples" in deciding to pass an adoption law that prohibits adoption by un-
married cohabitating individuals); see also Hamilton, supra note 77, at 358-59 (discussing
how the traditional marital family receives significantly greater government benefits and
protections than the non-traditional family where two unmarried individuals serve as co-
parents).
89. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 340.
90. See Kupenda, supra note 20, at 717 (suggesting the same result in the context of
two African-American individuals who are involved in a non-sexual friendship and who
adopt an African-American child together).
91. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 23, at 1348 (advocating the recognition of a legal
status for people who have close bonds but do not want to marry each other, and the
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ents decide to have their friendship legally recognized by the state,
the law protects the relationship such that if one co-parent dies, intes-
tate succession and other inheritance rules apply to the other co-par-
ent in the same manner as if the individuals were legally married.92
Providing protections and benefits to two unmarried individuals
would likely not involve a great amount of change in many places. In
response to the reduction in married couples, "10 states and 161 local
governments now offer some sort of employee protections and bene-
fits-from basic bereavement rights to full health insurance cover-
age-to [individuals involved in non-marital relationships].'93
Scholars extensively discuss government extension of benefits to
non-traditional families in family law literature, with many arguing
that providing benefits for married individuals remains an ineffective
proxy for the state's goal of supporting private care for dependents.94
Instead, these scholars argue that states would have considerably more
success in meeting their goals if they provided support for family
structures based on whether the families contained children, regard-
less of the parents' marital status.95 Altering the benefit structure to
include non-traditional parent-child relationships would not only ben-
efit potential adoptive children and parents, but also would benefit a
significant number of children and parents who exist outside of the
adoption realm. By giving benefits only to the traditional family struc-
ture, the government disadvantages the great number of children who
already live in non-traditional family structures.9 6 Furthermore, a ben-
efit system that fails to include non-traditional families has detrimen-
tal race and class-based effects. The traditional family structure
remains significantly more prevalent among middle or upper class
white individuals.9 7 Thus, unfortunately for non-white children, bene-
creation of the status "designated friends"); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106
MICH. L. REv. 189, 228-29 (2007) (calling "for explicit state recognition of friendship" as
"simultaneous [legal] recognition of friends and family... would.., support individuals'
choices about how to structure their lives").
92. Chambers, supra note 23, at 1352-53.
93. Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Singles Seek Financial, Legal Perks Offered Marrieds, Fox NEws,
Nov. 20, 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,103590,00.html.
94. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 77, at 307, 314, 356-60.
95. Id.; see also Fineman, supra note 9, at 245-46.
96. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 358-60; see also id. at 359 ("Across the United
States, unmarried men and women who live together are almost as likely to be raising
children as are married couples. But because they have chosen not to formalize their rela-
tionships, they must manage caretaking without many of the benefits accorded marital
families." (footnote omitted)).
97. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 508-11 (1977) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (stating that "the 'nuclear family' is the pattern so often found in much of white
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fit systems that only reward traditional family structures "grossly favor
their white counterparts."9 8
3. Stability as a Result of Financial Resources
If the law were to recognize and protect the non-traditional pro-
posed model in the same manner as traditional family structures, chil-
dren living in the proposed model may end up with even greater
economic stability than those living in traditional family structures. In
contrast to many traditional families where only one parent contrib-
utes financially to the household, 99 the proposed model potentially
provides the child with the support of two financially independent in-
dividuals. 10 0 One co-parent's well-being, as well as the child's, likely
would not depend on the other "bread-winning" parent. Providing
adoptive children with two independent, financially solvent parents
complements the "strong societal policy [in our country] that favors
charging at least two persons with support obligations for each
child."1 0 1
4. Love and Emotional Support
A person's ability to love and offer emotional support to a child
depends on his or her personality traits (such as empathy, sympathy,
understanding, and kindness) and has no logical connection to that
individual's marital or relationship status. 10 2 When two friends jointly
adopt a child, the family arguably consists of two individuals who each
strongly desire to raise a child together. The structure advocated here
suburbia" and does not represent the norm for many lower and working class families or
for many racial and ethnic minority groups).
98. C. Quince Hopkins, The Supreme Court's Family Law Doctrine Revisited: Insights from
Social Science on Family Structures and Kinship Change in the United States, 13 CORNELL J.L. &
PuB. POL'Y 431, 492 (2004).
99. KATHLEEN GERSON &JERRYJACOBS, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND GENDER
EQUALITY 43 (2004) (stating that over forty percent of marital households do not consist of
dual income earners).
100. Of course, even under the proposed model there is the possibility that one co-
parent would be financially dependent on the other co-parent, or, for other reasons, not
financially independent. The proposed model, however, envisions two individuals who
each, on their own, would be eligible to adopt a child. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of
Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1298 n.15 (Barkett,J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) ("If an applicant were unemployed and had no immediate job pros-
pects or other present means of financially supporting a child, no placement agency would
even consider permitting an adoption ... .
101. Storrow, supra note 8, at 321.
102. See Lofion, 377 F.3d at 1298 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) ("[Ilt is not marriage that guarantees a stable, caring environment for children[,]
but the character of the individual caregiver.").
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lacks any marital or otherwise romantic relationship whereby one
partner may agree to the adoption in order to accommodate his or
her significant other. However, each relationship and individual is dif-
ferent, and adoption decision-makers should undertake an individual
evaluation of each individual adoptive parent's characteristics and
abilities. This Article does not suggest that adoption decision-makers
give preference to the proposed family model over other family struc-
tures. Rather, it simply proposes that adoption agencies not dismiss
potential adoptive parents solely based on their marital status or de-
sired family structure.
In sum, the traditional family represents a decreasingly effective
proxy to further adoption law's ends. In spite of this, few courts recog-
nize that evaluating individuals on their capacity to care for a child,
rather than their family structure, most effectively promotes adoptive
children's best interests.10 3 Thus, states should reevaluate their cur-
rent adoption policies and explore the ability of non-traditional family
structures, such as the proposed model, to further the goals of adop-
tion law.
B. Alternatives for Children Awaiting Adoption
Even if legislatures, courts, and adoption agencies continue to ad-
here to the belief that traditional family structures represent the opti-
mal alternative for adoptive children, the proposed model remains
relevant. The number of children awaiting adoption greatly exceeds
the number of traditional families willing to adopt.10 4 With this reality
in mind, adoption decision-makers in favor of the traditional family
structure may find the proposed model to constitute the next best
alternative for these children.
1. Children Who Would Remain Wards of the State
Courts and legislatures alike recognize that a primary goal of
adoption law is to prevent as many children as possible from growing
up in an institutional setting without the love and support of a fam-
ily. 105 In fact, even jurisdictions with highly restrictive adoption stat-
103. Storrow, supra note 8, at 341-43; see also In reAdoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271,
1274 (Vt. 1993) ("When the statute is read as a whole, we see that its general purpose is to
clarify and protect the legal rights of the adopted person[,] ... not to proscribe adoptions
by certain combinations of individuals.").
104. AFCARS REPORT 13, supra note 16, at 5.
105. See supra notes 1-2, 74, and accompanying text (discussing adoption as the pre-
ferred choice for children who will not be raised by their biological parents).
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utes such as Utah employ the "least detrimental standard."1 06 Under
this standard, courts and adoption agencies allow for adoptions by in-
dividuals with disfavored characteristics, where such individuals re-
present "the only people who can [and are willing to] give the
children the . . .foundation for realizing their highest potential."'0 7
Thus, even courts in jurisdictions with the most restrictive adoption
laws realize providing a child with a home in a loving and supportive
non-traditional family represents a better alternative than leaving the
child with no home at all.1 0 8
Implementation of the proposed model would help states ensure
that as few children as possible spend their lives in institutional set-
tings. In most states, adoption statutes direct courts and agencies to
choose the best placement "among the available homes."' 0 9 Research
and common sense indicate that when there are far more children
awaiting adoption than available homes, categorically excluding clas-
ses of potential adoptive parents means some children will live in insti-
tutional settings for the duration of their childhood."a 0 Broadening
the pool of prospective adoptive parents to include more categories
not only will provide homes to more children overall, but will also
offer those individuals making adoption decisions a greater ability to
match each child with the adoptive family who can best provide for
that particular child. 1
In addition to providing more homes overall for children await-
ing adoption, implementation of the proposed model will likely mean
that certain categories of children, whom traditional adoptive families
historically have disfavored, will find homes. Adoption literature refers
to children over a certain age, of certain racial minorities, or with spe-
cial physical or emotional needs as "hard-to-place" children, because
they have a low likelihood of being adopted. '1 2 Non-traditional co-
106. In re Adoption of W.A.T., 808 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
107. Id.
108. See Storrow, supra note 8, at 347 (discussing instances where courts ruled that "a
blanket exclusion" of an entire class of individuals from standing to adopt is simply bad
public policy).
109. Wald, supra note 1, at 385.
110. See Woodhouse, supra note 15, at 326.
111. Woodhouse, supra note 15, at 324-25. By way of example, if a gay or lesbian indi-
vidual had specific expertise in dealing with a child's medical or behavioral issues, and the
state categorically banned that person from adopting because of his or her sexual orienta-
tion, the exclusion would deny the child the opportunity for placement with the individual
who could best provide for his or her needs. Id. at 325-26.
112. See, e.g., William Wesley Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 GA. L.
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parents may have a greater willingness to adopt non-traditional or
hard-to-place children, as these parents likely do not believe in the
existence of only one permissible type of family structure. 13 Studies
indicate that gay and lesbian or single parents are more likely than
heterosexual married couples to adopt hard-to-place children with
special needs.' 14 Experts estimate that many of these children would
remain without homes if state adoption law rendered non-traditional
parents ineligible to adopt.11 5 Overall, this Article's proposed model
represents a realistic and beneficial alternative for children who would
otherwise remain wards of the state.
2. Adoption by a Single Parent
In 2005, adoptions by single individuals accounted for over 27%
of all adoptions in the United States." t 6 It makes little sense to permit
single people to adopt individually, yet prohibit or discourage two sin-
gle people from adopting jointly. Child experts recognize that having
two parents, regardless of the co-parents' relationship status, leads to
an array of financial and emotional benefits for children.' 7 Joint
adoption by two close friends can provide the child with significant
benefits that a single parent, simply by the inherent nature of single
parenthood, cannot provide.
Financial support is indisputably a crucial aspect of caretaking. 118
Studies involving children raised by single parents conclude any detri-
ment to these children generally results from lower income levels and
other related financial characteristics of the family structure, rather
REv. 473, 490 n.64 (1990) ("[T]here is a rapidly growing number of hard-to-place children
who will probably spend the rest of their childhood without a permanent home; minority,
older and handicapped children are very unlikely to be adopted.").
113. See Wald, supra note 1, at 411 ("Reports indicate that the children placed with gay
individuals and couples often have special needs and are considered hard to place children
114. Id.; see also E. Gary Spitko, From Queer to Paternity: How Primary Gay Fathers Are
Changing Fatherhood and Gay Identity, 24 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 195, 211-12 & 211 n.53
(2005) (discussing how a high proportion of the children placed with gay individuals are
hard to place children who adoption agencies have been unable to place in a traditional
family structure).
115. EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST., EXPANDING RESOURCES FOR CHILDREN: IS
ADOPTION BY GAYS AND LESBIANS PART OF THE ANSWER FOR BoYs AND GIRLS WHO NEED
HOMES?, at 2, 12-13 (2006), available at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/
2006_Expanding-Resources for_Children%20March_.pdf; Wald, supra note 1, at 411;
Woodhouse, supra note 15, at 326; see also Spitko, supra note 114, at 211 n.53.
116. AFCARS REPORT 13, supra note 16, at 8.
117. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 568 (Cal. 2003).
118. Hamilton, supra note 77, at 362.
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than from the lack of a second parent.'19 The proposed model allows
two individuals who the state classifies as eligible to adopt on their
own, but choose to do so jointly, to adopt a child. Thus, this model
provides the child with the potential for income and financial support
from two parents as opposed to a single parent.
The potential for income from both parents, however, comprises
only one of the benefits that children will receive by having two legally
recognized parents. Children with two legal parents also gain the sig-
nificant protection that if one co-parent dies, custody of the child au-
tomatically goes to the other parent, and the child does not become a
ward of the state.' 20 These children also receive legal entitlement to
"both parents' employer-and/or government-sponsored health and
disability insurance; education, housing, and nutrition assistance; and
social security benefits. 11 21 Additionally, children with two legally rec-
ognized parents will benefit from inheritance rights as to each par-
ent.1 22 Finally, children will have two individuals to provide them with
love and emotional support. As one judge recognized, "[a] child
who.., receives the love and nurture of even a single parent [should]
be counted among the blessed .. . [and where] a child has two adults
dedicated to his welfare ... [t]here is no reason in law, logic, or social
[policy] to obstruct such a favorable situation."'123
II. Why the Proposed Model Has Not Yet Emerged:
Adoption Law's Underlying Assumptions
While it is impossible to conceive of every reason states may have
for not implementing, or even seriously considering, the proposed
model, the three basic assumptions of adoption law discussed in this
Part constitute the strongest and most probable state concerns regard-
ing the proposed model. These three assumptions are that: (1) a
healthy two-parent family necessarily consists of co-parents who reside
in the same household, (2) the ideal family involves co-parents who
share a romantic, sexual relationship, and (3) effective family struc-
tures necessarily consist of two parents committed not only to their
children, but also to one another.
119. See id. at 360 & nn.210-14; see also Kupenda, supra note 20, at 709 ("[Mluch of the
problem with single parenting rests with economics.").
120. In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229, 242 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
121. Id. (quoting In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003)); see also In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 858-59 (D.C. 1995) (discussing all of the bene-
fits children receive as a result of having two individuals legally recognized as parents).
122. In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 858.
123. In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt 1993).
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A. Co-Residing Co-Parents
Adoption law likely assumes that a healthy two-parent family nec-
essarily consists of co-parents who reside in the same household, a sce-
nario that is less likely to occur with the proposed model.1 24 With
most states retaining a post-divorce presumption ofjoint custody, how-
ever, a significant number of children already split their time between
two households. 125 Research involving children whose parents share
physical custody demonstrates that such living arrangements are asso-
ciated with positive outcomes for children's well-being.' 26 Addition-
ally, research shows that even in the post-divorce context a child's
well-being does not depend primarily on family structure but instead
on other factors such as level of familial conflict, poverty, abuse, neg-
lect, and poor school systems.' 27
Importantly, the family structure advocated here arguably in-
volves a much lessened risk of harm to the child than joint physical
custody arrangements in the divorce context. When two close friends
adopt, from the very start of the familial relationship the child will
know and expect a family structure that may involve spending time in
two separate households. Unlike in the divorce context, no major dis-
ruption to the child's regular way of life or familial expectations will
occur. 1 28 Finally, the two households likely will function more effec-
124. The assumption that a family unit contains only those members who reside to-
gether remains a pervasive assumption even beyond the context of adoption law. For exam-
ple, the United States Census Bureau defines family as "group of two people or more ...
related by birth, marriage, or adoption residing together." POPULATION Dry., U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS): DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS, http://www.
census.gov/population/www/cps/cpsdef.html (last visited May 1, 2009).
125. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (noting the presumption of joint
custody in the majority of states).
126. Am. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, REPORT TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CHILD AND FAMILY
WELFARE 3 (1995) ("The research reviewed supports the conclusion that joint custody is
associated with certain favorable outcomes for children including father involvement, best
interest of the child for adjustment outcomes, child support, reduced relitigation costs,
and sometimes reduced parental conflict."); Robert Bauserman, Child Adjustment in Joint-
Custody Versus Sole-Custody Arrangements: A Meta-Analytic Review, 16J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91, 91
(2002) ("Children in joint physical or legal custody were better adjusted than children in
sole-custody settings[,] .. . [and] no different from those in intact families."); see also E.
MAVIS HETHERINGTON &JOSEPHINE D. ARASTEH, IMPACT OF DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING, AND
STEPPARENTING ON CHILDREN 73 (1988).
127. Hamilton, supra note 77, at 345.
128. See Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (N.Y. 1978) (explaining that joint
custody can be disruptive and may also increase the pain of divorce for children); Dodd v.
Dodd, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) ("Experts in the field have expressed
opposition to divided custody on the ground that change and discontinuity threaten the
child's emotional well-being."); Ben Barlow, Divorce Child Custody Mediation: In Order to Form
a More Perfect Disunion?, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 499, 510-11 (2005); see also id. at 511 ("Four
[Vol. 43
Spring 2009] ALLOWING FRIENDS TO ADOPT 821
tively as co-parents, as the close friends will not have just experienced
a divorce.
Although the traditional family structure involves co-parents who
reside in the same household, many cultures do not recognize co-resi-
dence as a necessary characteristic of the family unit.129 Even within
the United States, research demonstrates that "the notion of co-resi-
dence as a critical symbol or marker of 'family' is significantly lower in
lower class families than for middle [or upper] class families. '1 30 Our
laws and census methodologies that presuppose only the traditional
family structure exclude a large number of functioning families falling
outside the traditional definition of family.13' This bias largely pre-
vents the recognition that a significant number of non-traditional fam-
ilies function effectively without adhering to the traditional rule of co-
residency. 132 Systematic failure to recognize other types of effectively
functioning family structures allows the traditional co-residing family
structure to keep its privileged status in the adoption realm as the
"normal" or "proper" family model.
Despite adoption law's general exclusion of family structures that
lack parental co-residence, a few courts have recognized the legiti-
macy of these family structures in the adoption context. In Sharon S. v.
Superior Court,133 the California Supreme Court rejected the idea that
adoption statutes contain an overriding requirement that co-parents
reside in the same household.134 The court instead focused on each
potential parent's ability to effectively raise a child, warning that co-
residency requirements would exclude "qualified adoptive parents
who might live apart for reasons having no bearing on whether an
adoption is in a particular child's interest. ' 13 5 Likewise, inJhordan C. v.
Mary K.,136 the California Court of Appeal, First District, specifically
noted the "uncontradicted expert testimony" that full-time residency
between a parent and his or her child does not constitute an absolute
major causes of stress for children of divorcing parents are (1) the family they have always
known will be different; (2) loss of attachment; (3) fear of abandonment; and[ ] (4) hostil-
ity between the parents.").
129. Hopkins, supra note 98, at 477.
130. Id. at 483.
131. Id. at 492-93.
132. Id.
133. 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003).
134. Id. at 569 n.17.
135. Id. at 572; see alsoJacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 476, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
(awarding shared physical custody of two children to the biological mother, her former
lesbian partner, and the sperm donor, all of whom resided in different households).
136. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
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requirement for effective parenthood. 137 The court noted research
demonstrating that if the time spent by the child with each parent was
of adequate frequency and quality, the parent-child relationship could
successfully form. 138
The assumption that healthy two-parent families cannot consist of
co-parents who reside in separate households ignores the reality of a
great number of families successfully functioning within the United
States. Perhaps if our laws and practices provided greater recognition
to such structures, the misplaced fear that families could not function
effectively without parental co-residency would cease to exist. Adop-
tion laws should refrain from repeating these mistakes, because the
failure to recognize that family structures can function effectively with-
out parental co-residency ultimately hurts children who remain with-
out homes.
B. Sexually Intimate Co-Parents
Another underlying assumption of adoption law is that the ideal
family involves co-parents who share a romantic, sexual relation-
ship. 139 Researchers present no evidence, however, suggesting that a
sexual relationship makes two individuals better able to function as co-
parents. Even as to traditional married co-parents, states do not re-
quire that such individuals engage in sexual relations. In fact, almost
20% of married individuals report that they are in "sexless mar-
riages,"'140 and this number only reflects the number of individuals
willing to admit the lack of sex within their marriage. Many marriages
thus turn into what most people would define as a close, committed,
non-sexual friendship, so that even children raised within the tradi-
tional family structure may not have sexually intimate co-parents. Con-
sequently, states should recognize that sexual activity between co-
parents has little bearing on their ability to raise a child.
C. Co-Parents Who Commit to Each Other
Finally, adoption lawmakers may assume that effective family
structures necessarily consist of two parents committed not only to
137. Id. at 537 n.9.
138. Id.
139. BEREBITSKY, supra note 8, at 3 (discussing adoption practice and the assumption of
the "ideal and only legitimate family" as "the nuclear, democratic family-the sexually satis-
fied, playfully compatible heterosexual couple").
140. Psychologists define "sexless marriages" as marriages in which the individuals have
sex with each other less than ten times per year. Laura Berman, Tired? Low Libido? Find the
Real Reasons for Sexless Marriages, CHI. SUN TiME.S, Oct. 30, 2006.
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their children, but also to one another. Consequently, with the pro-
posed model, states may fear that one or both of the co-parents will
become involved in a romantic relationship, causing problems within
the family structure. States should consider the fact that adoption law
already provides for adoption by single individuals,' 4 1 who will often,
and are even expected to, introduce a significant other into the family
structure at some point in the future. 142 Additionally, as identified ear-
lier, our laws and societal norms reflect the reality that half of all mar-
ried individuals will divorce, and a great number will remarry. 143
Family law already allows for the vast construction of family structures
that consist of a child, his or her legal parent(s), and the significant
other(s) of the legal parent(s). 144
The laws governing each parent's obligations and rights in the
joint custody context could also govern the arrangement proposed
here. 145 Because co-parents will have agreed upon the details of the
joint adoption arrangement from the beginning, the addition of a sig-
nificant other to the life of one of the co-parents will not affect either
of the co-parent's obligations or protections. Finally, as discussed in
Part IV, co-parents, upon adoption, will agree to a plan designating
the specific rights each will have to make decisions regarding the
child. The parenting plans may further provide that the addition of a
significant other to a co-parent's life will not alter either co-parent's
rights or obligations.1 46
IV. Implementation of the Proposed Model
While each state may implement the proposed model in the man-
ner it deems best, this Part provides a number of guiding principles
that states may find useful to consider throughout the implementa-
tion process.
141. Adoptions by single individuals constitute over one-fourth of all adoptions. AF-
CARS REPORT 13, supra note 16, at 8.
142. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 822 (11 th Cir.
2004) ("[H]eterosexual singles have a markedly greater probability of eventually establish-
ing a married household.").
143. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text (discussing the implementation of
parenting plans in the joint custody context).
146. See infta notes 161-66 and accompanying text (discussing the potential require-
ments of parenting plans).
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A. De-emphasizing Family Structure
States should enact family-related legislation that focuses less on
family structure. As a starting point, instead of using marriage as a
proxy for providing benefits and protections to families, future legisla-
tion should provide direct support to the child-parent relationship re-
gardless of the parents' relationship status. 147 Other countries have
successfully implemented programs that provide support and protec-
tion for caretaking functions. 48 These programs change the support
systems' status quo and take steps to ensure that both caretakers and
dependents receive adequate levels of support.1 49
Although eliminating marriage as a proxy for advancing rights
and benefits to families represents only one example of a possible
change to de-emphasize family form, similar steps could effectively al-
ter society's views regarding the correctness of the continued reliance
on the traditional family structure. Further, it would allow significantly
more individuals to live in the non-traditional family form that works
best for them, without sacrificing governmental support and protec-
tions. Overall, recognizing non-traditional families as legitimate and
focusing legislation on the child-parent relationship instead of the
marital relationship would provide adoption decision-makers with a
greater level of comfort in placing children in non-traditional family
structures such as the one advocated here.
B. Changing the Wording of Adoption Laws
Along with changing legislation to de-emphasize the overall focus
on family structure, states should also amend their adoption laws to
explicitly allow explicitly for adoption by non-traditional parents.
Some courts read legislation to allow two non-traditional parents to
adopt, even if the statutory language does not expressly address such
parents. 150 These courts use tools of statutory construction, such as
147. Hamilton, supra note 77, at 368-69.
148. Id. at 369-70.
149. Id. at 369.
150. See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 846-47 (D.C. 1995) (upholding adoption
rights for unmarried couples because "[w]ords importing the singular number shall be
held to include the plural, and vice versa, except where such construction would be unrea-
sonable"); In reJacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 401 (N.Y. 1995) (reading the statute to allow adop-
tions by unmarried second-parents because such adoptions were consistent with the spirit
and policies behind the statute); In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass.
1993) (allowing adoption by an unmarried couple where "[t]here is nothing on the face of
the statute which precludes the joint adoption of a child by two unmarried cohabitants[,]"
and noting that "[a]lthough the singular 'a person' is used, it is a legislatively mandated
rule of statutory construction that '(w]ords importing the singular number may extend
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reading phrases that grant adoptive rights to an unmarried "individ-
ual," as necessarily including its plural form, unmarried "individu-
als."' t 5 1 Such courts can then grant adoption rights to two unmarried
individuals seeking to adopt a child jointly. 152
Not all courts, however, demonstrate a willingness to interpret
ambiguous statutes in a manner that permits adoption by non-tradi-
tional co-parents. 153 Legislatures could send a clearer message to
adoption agencies and courts by amending the words of adoption stat-
utes to provide expressly for adoptions by unmarried individuals who
wish to adoptjointly, regardless of the parents' relationship status. Ad-
ditionally, legislatures could go further and amend the statutes to pro-
vide for joint adoption by two individuals involved in a close
friendship.
C. Implementing Nondiscrimination Policies
In addition to amending current adoption statutes to allow ex-
plicitly for adoption by certain non-traditional co-parents, state legisla-
tures and adoption agencies could change their laws or governing
rules to prohibit discrimination against potential parents based on fac-
tors such as relationship status, marital status, sexual orientation, or
similar characteristics. Nondiscrimination policies would help prevent
adoption caseworkers from discriminating at the various decision-
making stages against non-traditional parents who state law classifies
as legally eligible to adopt. The implementation of nondiscrimination
policies would not involve a huge step in the field, as "[t]oday, family
law policy generally is based on the premise that presumptions in
favor or against particular categories of people do not serve the inter-
ests of children. 11 5 4 As discussed earlier, discrimination in the adop-
tion realm can undermine children's interests because excluding
classes of people as potential adoptive parents means that some chil-
and be applied to several persons' unless the resulting construction is 'inconsistent with
the manifest intent of the law-making body'" (internal citation omitted)).
151. See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 846-47; In reAdoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at
318-19.
152. See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 846-47; In reJacob, 660 N.E.2d at 401; In re
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318.
153. Annmarie Timmins, Adoption Law Is up for Interpretation, CONCORo MONITOR, Apr.
10, 2006, available at http://www.concordmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060
410/REPOSITORY/604100308 (discussing the split among New Hampshire courts, with
some counties reading the adoption law to allow for adoption by unmarried couples, and
some reading it to prohibit such adoptions).
154. Wald, supra note 1, at 384.
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dren will have to live in institutional settings for the duration of their
childhood. 155
Some states have already implemented nondiscrimination poli-
cies in the custody realm. In a number ofjurisdictions, courts may not
consider the race, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, or religion of
the parent except upon a showing of direct harm to the child.156 Even
in the adoption realm, for years courts have employed their own non-
discrimination policies by reading statutes to allow for adoption by
non-traditional parents.1 57 Nondiscrimination policies would not in-
hibit adoption agencies from making case-by-case determinations to
identify which potential parents would serve the child's best interests;
rather, they would ensure that adoption decision-makers do not bar
certain categories of co-parents from consideration solely based on
their relationship status. Lastly, states should prohibit discrimination
against certain categories of potential co-parents because such dis-
crimination hurts both children and society as a whole. Discrimina-
tion based on parents' relationship status "standardize [s] child-
rearing arrangements in a way that unnecessarily curtails diversity and
cultural pluralism."1 58
D. Developing Parenting Plans
Finally, before allowing two individuals involved in a close friend-
ship to adopt, states should require that the co-parents enter into a
legally binding "parenting plan." 159 Parenting plans, which a number
of states already successfully implement in the custody realm, would
explicitly identify each parent's rights and responsibilities with regard
to the child. 160 In many states these plans involve a great degree of
detail. In Missouri, for example, upon divorce parents must create a
155. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
156. Am. LAW INST., supra note 33, § 2.12 cmt. a (discussing the nondiscrimination pro-
visions in the custody statutes of various states).
157. See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 848 ("[Clourts over the years have entertained all
sorts of adoption petitions to create 'non-standard' families, granting some and denying
others in the prospective adoptee's best interests."); see also In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at
400-01 ("The pattern of amendments since the end of World War II evidences a successive
expansion of the categories of persons entitled to adopt regardless of their marital status or
sexual orientation.").
158. AM. LAw INST., supra note 33, § 2.02 cmt. c.
159. Kupenda, supra note 20, at 717 (suggesting that if states allowed two single Afri-
can-American friends or relatives to jointly adopt an African-American child, "potential co-
parents might prefer to prepare in advance of the adoption a co-parenting agreement
160. Mary Kay Kisthardt, The AAML Model for a Parenting Plan, 19 J. Am. AcAD. MATRI-
MONY LAw 223, 226 (2005) (describing parenting plans as "detailed descriptions of the
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parenting plan, which, among other things, requires a "specific writ-
ten schedule detailing . . . residential time for each child with each
party."1 61 The schedule must include major holidays, school holidays,
birthdays, transfer arrangements, and telephone access. 162 Addition-
ally, the plan must address how the co-parents will make educational,
medical, dental, healthcare, and childcare decisions."63 Finally, the
plan must identify the dispute resolution procedures that the parents
will use for "matters on which the parties disagree." 164
States should structure required parenting plans as they see fit.
The more detail that parenting plans contain, however, the less likely
disputes regarding each parent's responsibilities and rights will arise.
Furthermore, a prevalent rule within the custody realm is that, once
agreed upon, courts should allow parents to modify the parenting
plan only in rare circumstances. 165 States should also implement this
rule in the adoption realm, as continued adherence to the parenting
plan will help to ensure consistency in the child's upbringing. Parent-
ing plans make a great deal of sense in contexts such as the one advo-
cated here, in which two independent individuals undertake the joint
endeavor of raising a child. 166 With a plan in place from the begin-
ning, co-parents will know and understand their respective parental
rights and responsibilities, and will have an agreed upon dispute reso-
lution mechanism in place should any major disagreements occur.
Conclusion
The 114,000 children presently without homes are those most
hurt by states' continued insistence on placing adoptive children only
in traditional family structures. State preferences or requirements re-
garding the placement of adoptive children into traditional family
structures often force children into family structures that simply do
not reflect the reality of today's society or denies children any home at
manner in which parents intend to continue caring for their children after divorce" and
noting that "[s]everal jurisdictions require a parenting plan in all cases").




165. See, e.g., Lindman v. Geissler, 872 N.E.2d 356, 361-62 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (hold-
ing that neither the former husband's threat to reduce the amount of time the children
spent with the former wife, nor the alleged financial hardship in the former wife's home
sufficiently established the significant change of circumstance that would warrant modify-
ing the shared parenting plan).
166. See generally Jacobs, supra note 19 (discussing how legally binding advance agree-
ments about the division of parental rights can facilitate multiparty parenting).
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all. Recognizing the changing familial realities for today's children,
states should reevaluate the historical reliance on the traditional fam-
ily structure as the only, or most effective, means of attaining the ends
of adoption law. This Article has identified a multitude of arguments
that suggest adoption law can reach its goal of placing children with
loving, supportive, and stable families as or more effectively through
placing children in non-traditional adoptive family structures like the
one advocated here.
What the family structure provides in substance, and not how it
looks in structure, largely determines a child's well-being. Expressly
authorizing and encouraging two individuals involved in a close
friendship to adopt jointly can provide adoptive children with emo-
tionally and financially supportive, loving, and stable homes. Child
welfare experts widely believe that adoption provides for the best in-
terests of children who do not have homes. If states continue to ad-
here to this belief, then they should work to further children's best
interests by allowing two individuals, each fit to raise a child alone but
who wish to do so jointly, the opportunity to provide an adoptive child
with a family.
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